



HIERARCHICAL DETERMINISTIC WALLETS

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HIERARCHICAL DETERMINISTIC WALLETS

- ▶ The problems of address reuse
- ▶ BIP 32 - HD Wallets
- ▶ BIP 39 - Mnemonics for HD wallet seeds
- ▶ BIPs 43 and 44 - Multi-Account Hierarchy for HD Wallets

INTER-DEPARTMENT DELIVERY
WRITE OUT ENTIRE LINE WHEN RECEIVED AND RE-USE UNTIL ALL LINES ARE USED

DELIVER TO	DEPARTMENT	SENT BY
recruitment	MN008-B217	Cathy Behre
Ruffman	CA235-2700	K. H. Klockman
Le Wendorff	MN 008-W340	Dolores Kelt
S. Ayable	MN008-1860	Al. Donahue
Obenlander	MN008-1860	Cheryl Thayer
Jane Zaugg	MN008-T850	C. Dexter
My Lam	MN008-W340	
SA	MN045-5200	
RAD JOHNSON	MN012-N106	Thuy N...

THE PROBLEMS OF ADDRESS REUSE

THE PROBLEMS OF ADDRESS REUSE

- ▶ Privacy
- ▶ ECDSA Security
- ▶ Quantum Security

PRIVACY


- ▶ Bitcoin transactions are public
- ▶ *Chain analysis* can uncover patterns
- ▶ Re-using addresses can reveal information

SECURITY

- ▶ ECDSA requires a (cryptographically secure random) ephemeral key
- ▶ Signing with the same ephemeral key reveals the private key
- ▶ If your PRNG is broken, then reusing an address can reveal the private key

QUANTUM SECURITY

- ▶ Sending *to* an address (using P2PKH) does not reveal the public key
- ▶ Spending *from* an address reveals the public key
- ▶ ECDSA is not quantum secure
- ▶ SHA256 is more quantum resistant



BIP 32 HD WALLETS

HD WALLETS – USE CASES

- ▶ Full wallet sharing
- ▶ Per-office or per-department balances
- ▶ Recurrent transactions
- ▶ Unsecure money receiver

SINGLE-USE ADDRESSES

- ▶ Best practice is to only use addresses once
- ▶ Having many unlinked private keys is difficult to backup and share
- ▶ Better to have a *seed* and a way to deterministically derive new private keys
- ▶ Sharing a hash chain is all or nothing
- ▶ A tree allows sub-branches to be shared individually

Seed



Private
key 1




Private
key 2



Private
key 3



...



BIP 32 OVERVIEW

- ▶ Generate a random 128-512 bit seed S
- ▶ Use HMACs (Hash Message Authentication Codes) to derive child nodes.
- ▶ For the *master key* m :
 - ▶ $I = \text{HMAC-SHA512}(\text{Key} = \text{"Bitcoin seed"}, \text{data} = S)$
 - ▶ I_L (the left 256 bits) is the *master private key*.
 - ▶ I_R (the right 256 bits) is the *master chain code*.

CHILD KEY DERIVATION (PRIVATE)

- ▶ Derive child key from parent key using HMACs
- ▶ $I = \text{HMAC-SHA512}(\text{key} = C_{\text{par}}, \text{data} = K_{\text{par}} \parallel i)$
non-hardened, $i < 2^{31}$
- ▶ $I = \text{HMAC-SHA512}(\text{key} = C_{\text{par}}, \text{data} = 0x00 \parallel k_{\text{par}} \parallel i)$
hardened, $i \geq 2^{31}$ notation: $i_H == i' == i + 2^{31}$
- ▶ $I_L + k_{\text{par}}$ is the *child private key*
- ▶ I_R is the *child chain code*
- ▶ This function is called CKDpriv

CHILD KEY DERIVATION (PUBLIC)

- ▶ Only possible for non-hardened child keys
- ▶ $I = \text{HMAC-SHA512}(\text{key} = C_{\text{par}}, \text{data} = K_{\text{par}} \parallel i)$
(non-hardened)
- ▶ $I_L + K_{\text{par}}$ is the *child public key*
- ▶ I_R is the *child chain code*
- ▶ This function is called CKDpub

SERIALIZATION FORMAT

- ▶ BIP 32 defines a 78 byte *extended key format*:
 - ▶ 4 bytes: "version" (eg 0x0488b21e - "xpub") for Bitcoin main net
 - ▶ 1 byte: depth in key derivation tree
 - ▶ 4 bytes: fingerprint of the parent's key
 - ▶ 4 bytes: child index
 - ▶ 32 bytes: chain code
 - ▶ 33 bytes: pub key compressed or 0x00 || priv key

KEY IDENTIFIER AND FINGERPRINT

- ▶ *Identifier* of extended key is HASH160(Public Key)
- ▶ This is the same data used in the Bitcoin address
- ▶ *fingerprint* of key is first 32 bits of identifier

KEY TREE


- ▶ Construct a tree of keys by repeatedly applying CKDpriv
- ▶ Notation: index of each child key, separated by slashes
- ▶ eg: $m/3_H/2/5$ or $m/3'/2/5$

DEFAULT WALLET LAYOUT (1)

- ▶ Wallet is organized as several 'accounts', indexed by i
- ▶ Each account has two keypair chains:
 - ▶ internal: used for giving out addresses.
Key notation: $\mathbf{m/i_H/1/k}$
 - ▶ external: used for change addresses, etc.
Key notation $\mathbf{m/i_H/0/k}$

DEFAULT WALLET LAYOUT (2)

BIP 32 - Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets



Child Key Derivation Function ~ $CKD(x,n) = \text{HMAC-SHA512}(x_{\text{Chain}}, x_{\text{PubKey}} || n)$

SECURITY OF HD WALLETS

- ▶ Given a child extended private key (k_i, c_i) and i , attacker cannot derive parent private key
- ▶ given any number of extended private keys (k_{i_j}, c_{i_j}) and i_j , attacker cannot determine if they are from a common parent
- ▶ **HOWEVER!**
- ▶ given a parent extended public key (K_{par}, c_{par}) and a non-hardened child private key, it is possible to derive a parent extended private key
 - ▶ a compromised extended private key compromises all private keys up to the first hardened parent



BIP 39

MNEMONICS

BIP 39

- ▶ A way to generate a BIP 32 seed using a mnemonic
- ▶ Submitted by Slush (Satoshi Labs) and used in Trezor
- ▶ Used in the Trezor hardware wallet
- ▶ There are some criticisms of this method

GENERATING THE MNEMONIC SENTENCE

- ▶ Generate 128-256 bits of entropy. Call these bits **ENT**
- ▶ Append the first $\text{len}(\text{ENT})/32$ bits of $\text{SHA256}(\text{ENT})$
- ▶ Split the concatenated bits into 11 bit chunks
- ▶ Each 11 bit chunk corresponds to an entry in a 2048 word list
- ▶ Example:
**SCHEME SPOT PHOTO CARD BABY MOUNTAIN
DEVICE KICK CRADLE PACT JOIN BORROW**

LENGTH OF MNEMONIC SENTENCE

len(ENT)	len(CS)	len(ENT + CS)	Number of words
128	4	132	12
192	6	198	18
256	8	264	24

GENERATING THE SEED FROM THE MNEMONIC SENTENCE

- ▶ Use PBKDF2 (Password-based Key Derivation Function 2)
 - ▶ 2048 rounds of HMAC-SHA256
- ▶ Password: the mnemonic sentence
- ▶ Salt: "mnemonic" + optional passphrase

CRITICISMS

- ▶ A fixed wordlist is required (because of the way the checksum is computed)
- ▶ Does not have 'versioning' - the seed does not indicate how the tree should be derived
- ▶ Relies on the security of the CSPRNG. Not clear whether using a random input to the PBKDF is any better than using a user-supplied password



BIPS 43 & 44 - MULTI-ACCOUNT HIERARCHIES

BIPS 43 AND 44

- ▶ Another two BIPs from Slush (Satoshi Labs)
- ▶ Imposes structure on the key tree
- ▶ Intended for portability between wallet implementations

BIP 43

- ▶ First level of tree hierarchy should be 'purpose'
m / purpose' / *
- ▶ For example, BIP 44 hierarchy starts:
m / 44' / *

BIP 44

- ▶ Defines entire structure for trees
- ▶ **m / purpose' / coin_type' / account' / change / address_index**
- ▶ purpose: 44'
- ▶ coin_type: defined in Satoshi Labs SLIP-0044. Bitcoin main net is 0'
- ▶ account: used for wallet user organization
- ▶ change: 0 for external chain, 1 for internal chain (same as BIP 32 default layout)
- ▶ address_index: set of addresses for use by the wallet

ACCOUNT DISCOVERY

- ▶ Used to restore wallet from backup seed
- ▶ Account field starts from 0
- ▶ Scans external chain until there's a gap of 20 unused addresses
- ▶ If account i has transactions, also try scanning account $i + 1$